LIST OF ACRONYMS

LOOKING FOR A MEANINGFUL DUTY FREE QUOTA FREE MARKET ACCESS INITIATIVE IN THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
For the Doha Round of multilateral trade talks to live up to their 'development' moniker, they must improve the access of the least developed countries (LDCs) to world markets.
This was why World Trade Organization members agreed at their Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December 2005 that "developed-country Members shall, and developing-country Members declaring themselves in a position to do so should provide dutyfree and quota-free market access on a lasting basis, for all products originating from all LDCs by 2008 or no later than the start of the implementation period in a manner that ensures stability, security and predictability".
Unfortunately, this ambitious objective was immediately limited by the next paragraph of the declaration adopted there: "Members facing difficulties at this time to provide market access. ……shall provide duty-free and quota-free market access for at least 97 per cent of products originating from LDCs defined at the tariff line level…"
Since then, progress in the negotiations has been slow. The revised draft compromise texts issued in July 2008 by the chairs of the negotiations on agriculture and non-agricultural market access did not add to the provisions for LDCs.
At time of writing, as WTO Members move into what might finally be a real 'end game' , it is time to shed light on some of the potential consequences of how the Duty Free Quota Free Market Access (DFQFMA) initiative for LDCs gets implemented.
Does the 3 percent difference in the scope of liberalization severely cramp the market access gains delivered to the LDCs? Which developing countries should join the initiative to boost the expected results? Which products might key importers choose to place within the exception? Which ones would be the most harmful for LDCs exports? How to ensure that new rules are not added on that would compromise the spirit, if not the letter, of this initiative?
This brief aims to answer these questions by opening up the 'black box' of uncertainty about how the dutyand quota-free market access initiative could be implemented in ten major markets: Canada, Japan, Norway , Switzerland, USA, Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Korea.
Setting the stage
Product coverage: Better 97% than nothing?
LDCs' export pattern is strongly affected by their weak economic structure. Most of them are highly specialised, producing a very narrow scope of goods. In many cases, a few raw commodities account for most of their exports. This concentration of exports on a few products is not only the characteristic of oil and gasexporting countries (Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, East Timor): it also holds true for other mineral products like iron ore (Mauritania), diamonds (Central Africa Republic, Liberia, Sierra Leone), copper (Zambia), aluminium (Mozambique); agricultural crops like cocoa (Sao Tome, Togo), cotton (Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Togo); or industrial products like apparel (Bangladesh).
This pattern of export specialization has two main consequences. First, even a very limited number of product exceptions could dampen any market access initiative aimed at providing export opportunities for LDCs. As depicted in Figure 1 , in most developed country markets, 3 percent of tariff lines at the HS6 level cover between 90 and 98 percent of exports from LDCs. So, the 3 percent exclusion could largely neutralise the DFQFMA initiative and make it worthless. As discussed later, it will be crucial to ensure real market access on Two other features are interesting: the EU and Canada, which have the most generous trade policy towards LDCs in terms of product coverage and/or rules or origin, also have the least concentrated basket of exports from LDCs. For example, 1 percent of HS6 products represent "just" 80 percent of the LDCs' exports to the EUcompared to nearly 88 percent in other OECD markets.
In other words, a generous preferential scheme may help LDCs diversify their exports. At the other extreme, 90 percent of LDC exports to Switzerland are accounted for by only 0.5 percent of HS6 positions.
Second, if LDCs currently export raw commodities on which countries do not levy tariffs at all, any new preferences will hardly benefit them in the short run: unrestricted market access may help to diversify their economies, but they will not seize any gains immediately. The implications of this vary substantially depending on the import market. Switzerland and China mainly import raw commodities (which face zero MFN Tariffs). Very high protection rates in agriculture combined with low preference coverage appears to limit strongly LDC exports. In the case of Switzerland, for instance, more than 67 percent of imports from LDCs are in products on which MFN tariffs are zero. Fewer than half of agricultural lines (300 HS6 products) are covered by strong preferences.
This is less than half of the preferences granted by the EU, Canada, the US, Japan or even Norway (more than 450 agricultural lines are duty-free for LDCs). This has a deep impact on the trade flows. On the other end of the spectrum, preferences granted by Norway and Canada play a significant role, and more than 60 percent of the imports used the preferential duty free access
The case of the US is particularly interesting, since only 6 percent of LDC exports are made up of products that face no MFN tariffs. Preferences still play an important role, in particular the US' African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for sub-Saharan countries.
Most notably, 44 percent of LDC exports to the US are still penalised by tariffs: therefore, the completion of the Doha Round could simultaneously result in both preference erosion and new market access creation there, with the consequence that conflicting interests between LDCs may surface.
As for Japan, the last GSP reform concerning the LDCs, in 2007, has strongly increased duty free coverage, reaching 99 percent for all products and nearly 97.5 percent for agriculture. Due to this, 45 percent of LDC exports take place under a preferential scheme. However, for key commodities that are still excluded, such as rice the MFN tariff is nearly prohibitive and only
In order to grant them new preferential margins, it is crucial to widen to the maximum the scope of existing GSP schemes for LDCs in developed markets, and to create new preferential access in dynamic emerging markets. However, if the Hong Kong declaration says that developed economies "shall" join the DFQFMA initiative for LDCs, it says that non-LDC developing economies "should" do it. This grammatical subtlety, which marks the difference between mandatory obligation and mere exhortation, could have heavy implications for LDCs if the Doha Round defines global trade relations for the next 20 years at a time where emerging markets are growing at twice the rate of OECD countries. Last, special and differential treatment for developing countries means that they will retain relatively higher tariff levels, making them the only place where significant preferential margins can be granted to LDCs.
To make a deal politically acceptable, the benefits of liberalization should be shared among all WTO members, especially LDCs and developing countries. If emerging economies take part of the LDCs' existing market shares in the developed world, they have to let the LDCs find new market opportunities in their own economies. Moreover, in most of the cases, the technical and phytosanitary requirements of developing countries are much easier for LDC exporters to meet than the comparable non-tariff barriers in OECD markets. A key issue is to determine which products will be affected by the DFQFMA. In order to select the 3 percent of products that countries would likely exclude from the DFQFMA initiative, we adapt the political economy model developed by Jean, Martin and Laborde (2008) .
For an importing country, the sensitivity of a product in the DFQFMA is equal to the square term of the power of the applied tariff times the value of imports at domestic prices coming from LDCs. For each importer, this criterion is applied at the bilateral basis then aggregated over all LDCs
In this context, the WTO DFQF market access initiative becomes less and less attractive for LDCs each month, and so, the scope of negotiations shrinks. Even if the DFQF initiative may secure preferential access granted by current EBA-like schemes, the value of the initiative, i.e., the value of preferences, is decreasing.
With time, the LDCs' objectives will have to focus on three features of the DFQFMA: make the unilateral policies binding, target and eliminate protection of the remaining items outside the current free access scheme (a full 100 percent access and not 97, 98, or even 99 percent), and ensure that rules of origin will not be an obstacle to seizing these opportunities.
The relevant applied tariff is the post-Doha tariff in the absence of a DFQFMA initiative. Thus, the choice of products excluded would be affected by a country's initial binding overhang, initial preferential margins, the structure of trade and the deepness of the Doha cut, including flexibility. Step by step, Japan has increased the coverage of its LDC GSP scheme to reach 99% of its tariff lines . Table 2 displays the distribution of products that are likely to be excluded from the DFQFMA by HS2 category. It appears that developed countries have a highly concentrated pattern (50 percent or more of the products in two chapters): for Canada those products are concentrated in dairy and poultry products; for Japan its is mainly fisheries products as well as numerous lines in footwear. For Norway and the US, the exclusions are likely to focus on apparel and clothing. Switzerland's projected exclusions are more widespread, covering several agricultural sectors (vegetables, vegetal oil, flowers, bulbs…).
Developing countries, on the other hand, would want to cover a wider range of products, with some country specificities: hides and cotton in Brazil; cotton, fisheries and copper products in China; fruits, nuts and some chemical products in India; mineral, fisheries and wearing apparel in South Korea and clothing sectors for Mexico.
The higher concentration in developed markets is explained by both the high specialization of LDCs and the limited number of remaining tariff peaks in these markets. Table 3 gives the 40 most likely to be excluded products by country.
Box 2. Methodology
To assess the effects of the DFQFMA initiative, we assess the incidence on tariffs of the last market access modalities (WTO TN/AG/W/4/rev.1 and WTO TN/MA/ W/103) using the MAcMapHS6v2 dataset, base year 2004 (Laborde, 2007) . Tiered and Swiss formulas, respectively for agriculture and non agriculture products, are applied on bound duties and effects are computed on applied rates including preferences. Additional tariff reduction for tropical products and tariff escalation are considered as well as country (Small and Vulnerable Economies, Low Binding rate countries, Recent Acceded Members…) and products (sensitive and special products) flexibility. See Laborde, Martin and Van Der Mensbrugghe 2008 for details on the tariff scenarios.
Since our goal is to have results on exports at the product level (Harmonised System (HS) at the 6 digit level) for each WTO LDC, we do not rely on a Computable General Equilibrium model but on a simple partial equilibrium model more relevant at this level of analysis. The model used is a simplified version of the partial equilibrium model used by Fontagne, Laborde and Mitaritonna (2008) to assess the impacts of the Economic Partnership Agreements on trade flows at the product level for 5,113 products and 70 countries.
This standard methodology has the main limitation to neglect trade creation effects when initial trade does not exist for a specific product on a bilateral basis. Put differently, if due to high initial tariffs, a LDC does not export a specific product to the destination market currently, the model will not be able to simulate trade creation for this relation. For this reason, we add another trade creation indicator in tables 4 and 5 where, instead of starting from initial bilateral trade pattern, we calibrate the model on global exports structure of the LDCs following the reference group methodology (Bouet et ali, 2008) . This solution is imperfect but can give relevant insights too.
Last, using MAcMapHS6v2 implies that our computation uses 2004 statistical information. This assumption limits the potential gains of the openness of emerging markets and comparison between importers but has no relevant effects on the product-ranking by country.
Developing: DFQFMA97% still delivers gains
At the same time, a DFQFMA97% would deliver real market access gains in developing country markets. Indeed, the basic Doha tariff reduction formulae will have limited impacts on applied tariffs in the developing world, and thus in comparison, DFQFMA97% would bring down a lot of tariffs. Reaching the 100% DFQFMA, of course, would involve eliminating these remaining tariffs.
Before looking at the DDA effects on trade flows, it is important to remember that we do not focus on the EU market. Most of the preference erosion will take place in this market, and the LDCs, which already benefit from the EBA initiative, will receive no new market opportunity with their most important trade partner.
The aggregated figures we present in this note do not assess the global effect of the DDA on LDC exports. We only focus on a sub-selection of markets for which the DFQFMA has a real impact. The reader should keep in mind that a fraction of the potential gains discussed here would offset the losses that LDCs will suffer on the EU market. The direct effects of a Doha Round without a DFQF initiative (row [E] ) are simple: the preference erosion suffered on the Canadian market has a strong impact with a reduction of about 25 percent of the current exports. If we exclude the US, this loss alone
Integrating these exclusion lists in the model allows us to get the results displayed in Table 4 for each LDC, and Table 5 for each destination markets. Detailed results by LDC and destination markets are available at www.ictsd. org. We present the results of our simulations as well as initial export levels and pre-andpost-Doha tariffs.
Regarding initial tariffs (row [B] ), LDCs face low average protection (below 1 percent) in most developed markets, except in the US where the protection is relatively high (5.4 percent). The Doha round, without the DFQFMA initiative (row [C]), will halve this initial level of protection. For the US, the strong effect of the Swiss formula will cut deeply wearing apparel tariffs, and deliver significant liberalization, cutting average tariffs from 5.4 to 2.3 percent.
Behind these aggregated figures, we note that some LDCs are more adversely affected due to their product specialization. For instance, Benin in the Canadian market (3.2 percent of initial protection, compared to 0.04 percent on average for all LDCs); Burkina Faso in Japan (pre-Doha tariffs of 8.6 percent, post DDA 2 percent); Asian LDCs (Bangladesh, Cambodia and Nepal) face pre-Doha tariffs of above 9 percent in the US, and still around 4 percent after.
1. 
Full DFQF minimises preference erosion
On the other hand, moving to the full DFQFMA by eliminating the 3 percent exclusion (row [G]) has positive or null impacts in nearly all the cases. The only real negative effects appear in the US for exports from Lesotho and Madagascar, which would suffer from increased competition from the Asian LDCs. However, the effects are quite limited compared to the basic Doha effects.
For instance, the DFQF100% will increase the losses of the Lesotho on the US market from -24% (Doha without DFQF) to -25.5% (Doha + DFQF100%). Overall, for the US to move from 97% to full coverage of all tariff lines would increase LDC exports to the country by nearly 20 percent -compared to the 6 percent rise from Doha tariff cuts without any LDC-specific initiative, or the 6.7 percent increase that would result from DFQFMA97%. In short, in the US market, the 3 percent exclusion is three times more important for LDCs than a Doha round with a DFQFMA97% clause.
For the five developed markets studied here, standard Doha tariff cuts combined with a DFQFMA100% would not be sufficient to increase total exports for 8 LDCs (Angola, Burundi, Chad, Guinea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritania, Rwanda). But DFQFMA100% in those five markets would offset the negative effects of multilateral liberalisation for several countries (DR Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Solomon Islands, Togo, Uganda, Zambia).
Supplementing standard Doha tariff cuts with DFQFMA100% would cause total export gains for LDCs in the five markets to jump from USD 617 million to 2,108 millions. Given these potential gains, there are substantial incentives for the LDCs to forge a common strategy. Adequate compensation measures should be designed for the few losers --for instance, they could receive priority consideration in Aid for Trade planning.
1.7 Full DFQF would create new trade opportunities Row [H] presents the effects of the full DFQFMA versus 97% DFQFMA using a slightly different methodology (cf. Box 2), which bases projected consequences less heavily on initial bilateral trade patterns, and incorporates potential new trade opportunities. For example, consider an LDC that exports rice duty free only to the EU, but does not currently export to Japan due to high MFN tariffs. In the above simulations, due to the standard modelling assumption, a DFQFMA100% will not change anything, since EU tariffs remain unchanged, and there are no initial weights (trade) on the Japanese tariff. Here, we assume a different weighting scheme that will consider potential exports to Japan.
In this framework, fully expanding DFQFMA for LDCs would nearly double their total gains. Moreover, losses are largely reduced, thanks to increased product diversification: only Angola, Chad, Lesotho and Madagascar have net losses. Using this approach, the US instead of accounting for nine-tenths of the gains for developed markets to move from 97 percent coverage to 100 percent, would only account for seven-tenths. The difference would be made up by new market opportunities in Japan, Switzerland, and Norway, for some commodities on which initial tariffs were prohibitive.
Looking at developing markets, the story is quite different: no major preference erosion takes place, even for Bangladesh in India. The only significant cases are the exports of Madagascar to South Korea and Nepal to India that fall by respectively USD 0.6 million (-11%) and USD 7 million (-1.9%). Standard Doha tariff reduction obligations would not create significant market opportunities in the developing world markets: a 1 percent increase in LDC exports to developing countries, concentrated in Mexico where LDC exports will jump by 40%.
DFQF and its enlargement would bring positive market access gains, but with varying magnitude. Due to its large size and relatively high tariff levels (post-Doha tariffs faced by LDCs would range from 6 to 59 percent with an average of 17.1 percent), the Indian market is the most attractive. There, a DFQFMA97% would Finally a full DFQF will have stronger effects on the LDC exports to the five emerging markets than on the developed ones. If we aggregate the 10 countries considered in the study and assume full DFQF, all LDCs become net winners, except Lesotho, with major improvements for Malawi, Nepal, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique (potential export growth above 100 percent). The combined effects of Doha tariff cuts and a full DFQF implemented by the 10 countries studied will raise LDCs exports to these markets by 49%.
Defining LDCs key products
This section examines the most important products exported by LDCs under preference schemes, i.e. the ones most likely to end up excluded from the DFQFMA. Even if it is a simple mercantilist indicator, we define the priority list based on export growth. For each market, we will consider the contribution of every product to export growth (row G in tables 4 and 5) and select the main contributors. Table 6 presents these results (20 more important products).
As already noted, the LDCs are a heterogeneous group. They do not have the same interests, since they specialize in different products and face different trade policies. Indeed, in some instances, their interests can be clearly antagonistic -for example, Bangladesh and African exporters of textiles and apparel compete in the US market. Without neglecting this reality, we prefer to present four priority lists by targeted market to allow LDCs negotiators to find a common ground rooted in transparency. The first three lists were elaborated by simply adding up country effects. It implies that the preferences of main exporters prevail. Using this approach, we get a list for the African LDCs, the Asian LDCs and finally, all LDC members of the WTO.
inally, we propose a list, based on another way to aggregate LDCs preferences. Since no perfect rule exists for preferences aggregations, we decide to rely on the Borda's rule. It is a simple mechanism widely used for collective choices, from the ancient Roman senate to the ranking of professional athletes. We start by making a complete ranked (export creation) list of products for each LDCs. The first product receive 5,114 points, the last receive 1 point. Then, we add the score for every product across countries and we get the final list by a descending ranking on this score. To sum up, this system gives the same weight to each LDC and considers the order of priority for every product for every LDC.
For the key market under investigation, we provide the 50 most important products for the African LDCs (list A), Asian LDCs (list B), all LDCs by adding up effects (list C) and all LDCs using a Borda mechanism (list D). Agricultural products, fisheries and textiles and apparel are the most frequent items. As expected, the different lists present several differences driven by trade specialization and existing preferential schemes.
Additional modalities
We will now discuss four other features of the DFQFMA that may greatly affect its efficiency: the rules of origin, discrimination between LDCs, tariff nomenclature use and anti-dumping rules.
The simple granting of tariff preferences is not enough; they have to be used too. This implies that the rules of origin related to the DFQFMA should be generous enough to be consistent with the reality of the LDCs' production structure where relativelyfew inputs are available domestically.. t is beyond the scope of this note to discuss the features of a good rules of origin system. Moreover, all rules of origin schemes for LDCs will have administrative costs, and would also drive up product costs by constraining the choice of inputs etc. If rules of origin are needed to avoid massive trade diversion, it is very difficult to define a standard rule for implementing them: every sector has its own specificity and for example, a valueadded criterion in one sector may be totally unrealistic for another.
Canada has, and the EU will soon have, simplified their respective rules of origin using the percentage of value added domestically as a criterion. If the system is simple, it is far from being perfect. The recent wave of globalization has been driven by an increase in the disaggregation of industrial production processes across several countries. Comparative advantages are less and less at the level of whole products, but simply a specific transformation step. Intra-corporate trade of multinational companies has been the growth engine of trade and the source of major productivity gains.
In this context, hoping that a LDC can create a significant share of value added is unrealistic, and a strong limitation on promoting manufacturing specialisation.
LDCs have narrow economies and should rely on their neighbours, in many cases developing countries, to provide necessary inputs. To ensure that the DFQFMA initiative allows LDCs to diversify their exports, well designed rules of origin are crucial. Table   4 However, since the number of key products for LDC exports is limited, it is not worth losing time negotiating general-but-inadequate rules of origin. Instead, the focus should be on ensuring that for these specific goods, the rules of origin will be compatible with the existing production structure.
ITo illustrate potential problems, Table 8 displays the current rate of use of EU preferences by LDCs for the most important products. For these products, the definition of rules of origin should be carefully defined.
The legal framework of the DFQFMA is still to be defined. It will be natural to integrate it with developed countries' GSP schemes as well as the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) being put together by developing countries. However, both policies are currently unilateral. Granting countries can change the rules when they want, which could potentially see countries banned, products excludproductised, and so on.
A major innovation for a Doha decision on unrestricted market access for LDCs will be to make these regimes binding, freed from discretional choices, protectionist moods or political blackmail. This will ensure better transparency and predictability, and therefore, promote trade and investment.
However, most GSP schemes include graduation mechanisms. These generally cause the most efficient producers to lose their preferences when they cross some thresholds, such as a certain share of total GSP imports, etc. Whether to allow such mechanisms has to be considered carefully. They will allow discrimination between LDCs and could conceivably result in a finely-tailored exclusion list that would neutralize any competitive industries in LDCs.
Another technical and legal issue is to define at which level the DFQFMA commitments should be done: at the international 6-digit HS level, or at the tariff line level (8-or 10-digit for some countries). The Hong Kong declaration and more recent modalities have clearly selected the "tariff line level" option. However, this choice is not neutral. At the HS6 level, countries have less freedom to surgically eliminate key products. Moreover, it is much more difficult to monitor partners' trade policies at the 8-or 10-digit level. If, at the WTO level, peer review will be relied on to keep deviant behaviour in check, it will be very difficult for LDCs, due to their human and technical capacity constraints, to ensure that their trade partners will not create new tariff lines in the future to exclude some "new" products from their past commitments.
It should be clear that DFQFMA commitments must be linked to strong decisions on anti-dumping procedures affecting LDCs exports. Without this, it would be easy for some countries to target sensitive imports from a LDC country -say texiles and apparel -with anti-dumping measures. Even the looming threat of these extra duties may deter investors from fully using new opportunities in LDC countries arising from the DFQFMA. Moreover, the cost, as well as the length time, required to raise a case at the WTO at the Dispute Settlement may deter the LDC from using their rights, giving stronger economies an incentive to abuse them. It is clear that intense negotiations involving LDCs, OECD countries and also emerging countries, on the restricted number of products discussed.
in this note may deliver significant market access gains for the least developed WTO members.
Is this goal reachable? On November 15th 1996, LDC ministers called for a contractual DFQF market access, based on a proposal from then-WTO Director-General, Renato Ruggiero. At that time, both the EU and the US clearly rejected this proposal. Twelve years latter, the EU has decided to implement such a policy and it has become apparen that the LDCs were not a threat to domestic producers. Even if the EU EBA can be improved (notably through more generous rules of Table 5 David Laborde -Looking for a meaningful Duty Free Quota Free Market Access Initiative In the Doha Development Agenda 
